I work in moral psychology, both on an experimental level and a conceptual level. On the one hand, I have collaborated on experiments that look at how self-directed moral emotions can impact attributions of responsibility through surveys designed to gauge the intuitions of respondents. On the other, I have been considering the evidentiary status of such moral intuitions in the first place, and how much weight it is legitimate to attribute to studies of exactly this sort. When taken together, I hope to have a better understanding of moral emotions, moral intuition, and moral psychology.
I am also interested in biomedical ethics, particularly the ethics of genetic modification. In this domain, I have focused on whether we could legitimately pursue germline gene editing in both human and non-human animals in light of extant informed consent protocols. I have argued that it is at best unclear how informed consent can permit us to engage in modification of inheritable traits. This is due to two main factors: the downstream effects are uncertain; and the very idea of securing consent — even proxy consent — for future generations is itself problematic.
- “Don’t edit the human germ line”
With Edward Lanphier, Fyodor Urnov, Sarah Ehlen Haecker, and Michael Werner. Nature 519 (2015): 410-11. Macmillan Publishers. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.
- “CRISPR/Cas9 and Germline Modification: New Difficulties in Obtaining Informed Consent”
The American Journal of Bioethics 15:12 (2015): 35-37. DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2015.1103816